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Temporary Reinstatement for
Discriminatory Recalls Under the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977
Alexandra V. Dellarcot
Introduction
Secretary of Labor ex rel. Piper v. KenAmerican Resources,
Inc.1 represents the mounting difficulty in applying the temporary
reinstatement provision 2 of the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act of 1977' ("Mine Act" or "Act"), section 105(c)(2), in the context
of layoffs and recalls.4 Piper adds a new layer of complexity to an
emerging body of case law by laying a foundation for the
application of temporary reinstatement in the context of
discriminatory recalls.
To complicate matters, the recent
temporary reinstatement decisions by the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Review Commission ("Commission"), regarding layoffs
and recalls, coincides with the Department of Labor's
unprecedented increase in filing of temporary reinstatement
requests and the severe economic downturn in the Appalachian
coalfields.' Inevitably, this increased caseload and the downturn
in the U.S. coal industry will eventually prompt the Commission
to articulate a legal standard for the application of temporary
reinstatement in discriminatory recall cases.

T. B.A., McGill University, 2008; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School,
2014. Many thanks to the editors and staff of Law and Inequality: A Journal of
Theory and Practice and Professor Brad Karkkainen for serving as my faculty
advisor. Any shortcomings are my own.
1. 35 FMSHRC 1969 (July 2013).
2. 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2) (2006) (temporary reinstatement provision).
3. Id. §§ 801 et seq.
4. See Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Rodriguez v. C.R. Meyer & Sons Co., 35 FMSHRC
1183 (May 2013); Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Ratliff v. Cobra Natural Res., LLC, 35
FMSHRC 394 (Feb. 2013); Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Shemwell v. Armstrong Coal Co.
(Shemwell II), 34 FMSHRC 1580 (July 2012); Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Shemwell v.
Armstrong Coal Co. (Shemwell I), 34 FMSHRC 996 (May 2012); Sec'y of Labor ex
rel. Gatlin v. KenAmerican Res., Inc., 31 FMSHRC 1050, 1053-54 (Oct. 2009); Sec'y
of Labor ex rel. Ondreako v. Kennecott Utah Copper Corp., 25 FMSHRC 585 (Oct.
2003).
5. See Piper, 35 FMSHRC at 1970-71 (dealing with failure to recall the
complainant during a recall).
6. See infra Part I.A-B.
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This Comment argues that the term "miner" in section 3(g) of
the Mine Act 7 is ambiguous, and therefore the term must be
interpreted in the context of the particular Mine Act section in
which it appears-in this case the temporary reinstatement
provision. Such an interpretation will include miners who are laid
off and then "blackballed" by not being recalled. Moreover, this
Comment concludes that a workable standard for the application
of the temporary reinstatement provision in the context of
discriminatory recalls will use a case-by-case approach, since it
provides the malleability needed to respond to changes in the
mining industry as they occur. Such an approach will further
build upon the majority's reasoning in Secretary of Labor ex rel.
Piper v. KenAmerican Resources, Inc. and incorporate elements
from the Commission's previous decisions involving tolling and
discriminatory layoff cases. Furthermore, a case-by-case approach
will help balance two competing themes in the Mine Act's
legislative history and jurisprudence-that section 105(c) of the
Mine Act must be construed expansively, to assure that miners
will not be inhibited in exercising their rights under the Act, and
that miners must have an "active part" in enforcing the Act.
Part I describes the coincidence of relevant trends in the
mining industry that serve as the backdrop to the Commission's
recent decisions regarding temporary reinstatement in the context
of layoffs and recalls. This includes the correlation between the
2010 Upper Big Branch mine disaster and the Department of
Labor's recent increase in filing temporary reinstatement cases;
the current layoffs in the coal mining industry, focusing on the
vulnerability of those working in the Appalachian coalfields; and
the socioeconomic impacts of coal mining in the Appalachian
region. Part II then provides a brief explanation of the temporary
reinstatement provision.
Part III summarizes the temporary
reinstatement case of Piper, which involves an alleged
discriminatory recall. Part IV analyzes the recent Commission
cases that have dealt with temporary reinstatement in the context
of layoffs-tolling and discriminatory layoff cases.
Part V
discusses the statutory interpretation of the term "miner" in the
temporary reinstatement provision.
Part VI concludes by
suggesting that a workable legal standard for the application of
the temporary reinstatement provision in the context of
discriminatory recalls will use a case-by-case approach.

7. 30 U.S.C. § 802(g) (2006).
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I. Relevant Trends in the Mining Industry
A. The 2010 Upper Big Branch Mine Disasterand the
Department of Labor's Increase in Filingfor Temporary
Reinstatement
The 2010 Upper Big Branch ("UBB") mine disaster was the
country's worst mine disaster in the last four decades.8 On April 5,
2010, a massive coal dust explosion occurred at the Upper Big
Branch Mine-South just outside of Montcoal, West Virginia,
killing twenty-nine miners.9 Among a slew of Mine Act violations,
the investigatory report by the Mine Safety and Health
Administration ("MSHA") found that the mine operator
"intimidated miners from voicing [their safety] complaints, either
internally or to MSHA."1
More disturbing, MSHA stated that
"[diespite the recognition by many miners of hazards throughout
UBB, no one had made a complaint to MSHA since June 8, 2006.
MSHA did not receive any complaint related to underground
hazards at UBB prior to the accident."1 Likewise, the witnesses
at the hearing before the House Education and Labor Committee
testified that the mine operator threatened and retaliated 1 against
2
miners who complained about health and safety conditions.
Following the UBB disaster, the Department of Labor
increased its filing of temporary reinstatement cases. 3 In 2012,
the Department of Labor filed forty-six temporary reinstatement
requests on behalf of miners who submitted complaints of
discrimination in the form of a suspension, layoff, discharge, or
other adverse action."4 This amount was more than double any
8. Ian Urbina, No Survivors Found After West Virginia Mine Disaster, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2OlO/04/10/us/lOwestvirginia.html.
9. COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH, MSHA, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION No. 46-08436, FATAL UNDERGROUND MINE EXPLOSION APRIL 5,
2010, UPPER BIG BRANCH MINE-SOUTH, PERFORMANCE COAL COMPANY MONTCOAL,
RALEIGH COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA, 1, 12 (2010), http://www.msha.gov/Fatals/2010

/UBB/FTL10c0331noappx.pdf.
10. Id. at 40.
11. Id. at 58-59.
12. Upper Big Branch Mine Tragedy: Field Hearing before the H. Comm. on
Educ. & Labor, 111th Cong. 32-34 (2010) (statement of Stanley "Goose" Stewart,
Upper Big Branch Miner), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG111hhrg56355/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg56355.pdf.
13. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, U.S. Labor Department's MSHA
Continues Increased Emphasis on Miner Discrimination Complaints, 46 Requests
for Temporary Reinstatement Made in 2012 (Jan. 29, 2013), available at
http://www.msha.gov/MEDIA/PRESS/2013/NR130129.pdf [hereinafter DOL Jan.
29, 2013 Press Release].
14. Id.
The Commission has defined an "adverse action" as "an act of
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previous year.1" This increase in filings is likely, if not mainly, due
to the UBB disaster and the subsequent federal investigation of
the explosion, which revealed serious issues of discrimination and
retaliation by the mine operator.
B. Current Layoff Trends in the Coal Mining Industry
Any legal standard used to grant an application of temporary
reinstatement in the context of discriminatory recalls will more
likely affect those working in the Appalachian coalfields due to the
current economic downturn in the coal mining industry.
Production in the Appalachian coalfields "is being squeezed by
economics, government regulations and even its own geology."1
Much of Appalachia's easy-to-reach coal seams are gone,1 7 and now
it takes more workers to maintain production levels, resulting in
higher labor costs. 8 Additionally, there is increased economic
pressure due to competition with high-producing western mines
that can mine coal at a cheaper price," as well as, the boom in oil
and gas production that has led to an overall decline in the U.S.
coal industry. 2° Likewise, coal companies in the Appalachian
commission or omission by the operator subjecting the affected miner to discipline
or a detriment in his employment relationship." Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Pendley v.
Highland Mining Co., 34 FMSHRC 1919, 1930 (Aug. 2012) (citing Pendley v.
FMSHRC, 601 F.3d 417, 428 (6th Cir. 2010)); but see Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Price v.
Jim Walter Res., Inc., 12 FMSHRC 1521, 1533 (Aug. 1990) (citing Sec'y of Labor ex
rel. Jenkins v. Hecla-Day Mines Corp., 6 FMSHRC 1842, 1848 n.2 (Aug. 1984) ("An
adverse action under section 105(c) of the Mine Act is not simply any operator
action that a miner does not like.")).
15. DOL Jan. 29, 2013 Press Release, supra note 13. Comparatively, the
Agency filed an average of twenty-five temporary reinstatement requests per year
between 2009 and 2012, and an average of six temporary reinstatement requests
per year between 1993 and 2008. Id. The Department also filed thirty-four
discrimination complaints in 2012, which was also more than in any previous year.
Id.
16. Appalachian Coal Mining Faces Grim Future, USA TODAY (May 19, 2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/moneybusiness/2013/05/19/woes-for-appalachiancoal-mining/2159139/ (stating coal operations in eastern Kentucky and southern
West Virginia are facing declining reserves, higher production costs, and
competition from other coal basins and natural gas).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.; see also Patrick Charles McGinley, Climate Change and the War on
Coal: Exploring the Dark Side, 13 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 255, 275 (2011) ("Midwestern
utility companies eschewed Appalachian coal for cheaper western coal."). In 2010,
according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, two massive surface
mines in Wyoming accounted for 20% of the nation's coal output. Id.
By
comparison, all the mines in Central Appalachia produced just 17% of U.S. coal in
2011. Id.
20. Marie Cusick, U.S. Demand for Coal Hits 63-Year Low, STATEIMPACT.
NPR.ORG (May 7, 2013, 10:01 AM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2013/
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region have begun expressing their concerns to their investors. 21
For example, Alpha Natural Resources, which operates eightynine mines in Central Appalachia, said in its 2012 annual report
that it expects production in those mines to decline by 10% by
2017.22
Another report projected a 31% drop in Central
Appalachia coal production between 2011 and 2020.3
Coal mining jobs are also part of a market that depends upon
political and other business factors. 4 President Barack Obama
has made fighting climate change a second-term priority, and is
directing the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to
complete carbon emissions standards for new and existing power
plants,26
thereby
pushing
for
cleaner-burning
plants. 7
Consequently, electric utilities, which have traditionally been
Appalachia's best coal customers, are retiring coal-fired plants or
upgrading plants to burn cheaper natural gas, and this trend is
likely to continue. 8
Moreover, tougher federal regulations
enforced by the Obama administration have been cited as a reason
for slowed coal production in the region.2 ' For example, the federal
government halted about forty mining permits in eastern
Kentucky causing the loss of about 3600 mining jobs.0
While the coal mining industry has historically been
characterized by boom and bust cycles, thereby causing layoffs and
job creation, 1 this might not be a typical bust cycle. The looming
05/07/u-s-demand-for-coal-hits-63-year-low/; see also Appalachian Coal Mining
Faces Grim Future,supra note 16.
21. Appalachian Coal Mining Faces Grim Future,supra note 16.
22. Id.
23. Id. (concluding from government data that production will fall from 185
million tons in 2011 to 128 million tons by 2020).
24. Taylor Kuykendall, Retraining for 'Life After Coal Mining', GROUNDED: A
STATE J. ENERGY BLOG (Nov. 15, 2012, 5:59 PM), http://www.statejournal.com
/story/19837430/retraining-for-life-after-coal-mining.
25. Cusick, supra note 20 (referencing President Obama's State of the Union
address).
26. Marie Cusick, Corbett Calls Obama's Climate Change Proposal a War on
Coal and Jobs, STATEIMPACT.NPR.ORG (June 25, 2013, 10:01 PM), http:llstat
eimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2013/06/25/corbett-calls-obamas-climate-changeproposal-a-war-on-coal-and-jobs/.
27. Noah Adams, In Kentucky's Coal Country, A Resentment for Obama, NPR
(Jan. 21, 2013, 5:05 PM), http://m.npr.org/story/169913701.
28. Appalachian Coal Mining Faces Grim Future,supra note 16.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See McGinley, supra note 19, at 271-77 (describing volatility of the U.S.
coal industry from 1940 to 2009); Jessica Lilly, Can West Virginia's Laid Off Coal
Miners Find New Careers?, W.VA. PUB. BROAD. (Nov. 12, 2013), http://wvpublic.org
/postlcan-west-virginias-laid-coal-miners-find-new-careers.
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potential for more layoffs in the coal mining industry is evidenced
by the federal government pouring grant money into the
Appalachian region.33 In 2013, the Department of Labor awarded
a $1,800,000 National Emergency Grant ("NEG") to WorkForce
West Virginia (which is in partnership with the United Mine
Workers of America ("UMWA") Career Centers, Inc.)34 to provide
retraining and reemployment services to dislocated coal miners
and displaced homemakers impacted by mass layoffs and coal
mine closures. According to WorkForce West Virginia, more than
4200 West Virginia coal miners have lost their jobs since March
2012.
This grant will help participants find new career paths
outside the coal mining industry and long-term reemployment
opportunities.
Similarly, in 2013, the Department of Labor awarded a
$5,192,500 NEG to Eastern Kentucky Concentrated Employment
Program, Inc. to assist coal miners and their families affected by
layoffs in eastern Kentucky."
Coal mining has been a bedrock
industry in the rural Appalachian regions of Kentucky since the
early 1900s and has furnished well-paying jobs to this historically
poor area. This grant mirrors the one in West Virginia. 40

32. Lilly, supra note 31 (quoting Mr. Brett Dillon).
33. Id.
34. Id.
See also WV Dislocated Coal Industry Workers, UMWA CAREER
CENTERS, INC, http://umwacc.com/news/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2013).
35. Training Grant for Dislocated Coal Miners and Displaced Homemakers,
WORKFORCE W. VA., http://www.wvcommerce.org/App Media/assets/doc/business
andworkforce/workforcewv/MinerTrainingGrantQA Final 9 24 12.pdf
(last
visited Dec. 1, 2013). The inclusion of displaced homemakers is due to the fact that
single-income households are common in the coalfields because miners' wages have
allowed many families to live comfortably with just one source of income.
Kuykendall, supra note 24.
36. Lilly, supra note 31.
37. Training Grant for Dislocated Coal Miners and Displaced Homemakers,
supra note 35; see also Jessica Lilly, RetrainingAvailable for Jobless Miners, W.VA.
PUB. BROAD. (Nov. 1, 2013, 12:47 PM), http://wvpublic.org/postlretraining-available
-jobless-miners (stating to date, more than 140 miners have completed retraining
through this grant).
38. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, US Department of Labor Announces
$5.2 Million Grant to Assist Eastern Kentucky Coal Miners, Spouses Affected by
Layoffs (Mar. 4, 2013), available at http://www.doleta.gov/ETANewsReleases
/20130361.cfm [hereinafter DOL Mar. 4, 2013 Press Release].
39. Joshua Wright, After 3,000 Coal Mining Layoffs, Eastern Kentucky
Regroups with Help from $5.2M Training Grant, EMSI (May 8, 2013), http:/
www.economicmodeling.com/2013/05/08/after-3000-coal-mining-layoffs-easternkentucky-regroups-with-help- from-5-2m-training-grant!.
40. See DOL Mar. 4, 2013 Press Release, supra note 38 (describing the grant).
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C. The Economics and Social Inequalities of Coal Mining

The softening of the coal mining industry only exacerbates
the socioeconomic impacts that coal mining has had on
Appalachia, thereby potentially increasing the vulnerability of coal
miners in the region to discriminatory layoffs and recalls. "Coal
has made, and kept, the people of Appalachia poor... The
percentage of persons below the poverty level in the coal counties
is nearly twice the national average, with a median household
income of between one half and two-thirds of the national
average."41 Coal counties also have poverty rates substantially
above the national median (particularly for White families,
children, and dependent populations),42 low median levels of
education and high levels of unemployment, and high levels of percapita disability and supplemental Social Security income. 3
Moreover, "[tihe economic dependence on the coal mining
industry combined with the devastating environmental and health
effects associated with coal mining, have resulted in unusable real
estate, lower education levels, and a generally lower standard of
living than anywhere else in this country."4 Professor Patrick
Charles McGinley explains that these socioeconomic impacts are
negative externalities of the coal and energy industries. Hence,
poverty in the Appalachian region is characterized by a lack of
41. Wendy B. Davis, Out of the Black Hole: Reclaiming the Crown of King Coal,
51 AM. U. L. REV. 905, 906 (2002) (stating that for decades the four-state
Appalachian coalfields region has been the poorest in the nation). A "coal county"
is a county in which mining provides more than 3% of total income. See Amy
Glasmeier, Living in Coal Country: What Kind of a Life is That?, NPR,
http://www.npr.org/documents/2006/jan/sagoeconomicprofile.pdf (last visited Oct.
30, 2013).
42. Glasmeier, supra note 41. For example, in 2003, median household income
was substantially below the national median. Id.
43. Id.; see also 60 Minutes: Disability, USA (CBS television broadcast Oct. 6,
2013), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/disability-usa/ (discussing
upcoming Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs hearing on Social
Security Disability fraud, and looking at the local Social Security Office in
Huntington, West Virginia where workers describe Social Security Disability as a
"vital" part of the local economy).
44. Davis, supra note 41, at 907; see also Anne Marie Lofaso, What We Owe Our
Coal Miners, 5 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 87, 93-94 (2011) (arguing social inequalities
and health disparities have long characterized the region, which is plagued with
characteristics of poverty such as drug abuse, subpar living conditions, and poor
education); McGinley, supra note 19, at 280 & n.114 (describing social and
environmental impacts of surface and underground mining in the Appalachian
region).
45. McGinley, supra note 19, at 265 (listing such negative externalities as
family and community disruption; economic stagnation; and accompanying lack of
educational, employment, and economic development opportunities-many or all of
which are borne by coalfield communities).
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economic diversification, which results in few meaningful job
opportunities. 6
Employee bargaining power is diminished in
isolated Appalachian coal mining communities because they are
built around monopsonistic coal mine operators, and there is an
absence of meaningful alternative employment.47 The result is a
situation where there is a single employer. 8
In these economically impoverished areas, coal mining might
be the only industry for hundreds of miles. " "For those living in
[these] mining communities, low levels of education, poor health
conditions, unstable work histories, and limited access to jobs
paying a living wage explain why people work in the mines."0 The
problems associated with the depressed regional economy are
compounded by the fact that Appalachian miners are well
compensated for their locality. 1 For example, starting salaries in
the mines are just under $100,000 per year for those right out of
high school.2 As Mr. Brett Dillon, director of the UMWA Career
Center office in Beckley, West Virginia and former coal miner
explains: "There's very few jobs in West Virginia that pays what a
coal miner makes or better."3
These negative externalities, when taken in conjunction with
the region's history of worker oppression, "make Appalachian
workers less mobile, first by funneling them into the relatively
well-paying mining jobs and then by making it more costly for
them to quit those jobs, even when faced with dangerous safety
conditions. These restraints on the free movement of labor results
in [a] labor market failure." 5

46. Lofaso, supra note 44, at 93.
47. Id. at 92, 95 (stating underground coal miners who work in West Virginia,
Kentucky, and Pennsylvania typically live in the surrounding Appalachian
countryside, and such isolated mining towns constitute textbook examples of labor
market monopsony); but see William M. Boal, Testing for Employer Monopsony in
Turn-of-the-Century Coal Mining, 26 RAND J. ECON. 519, 534 (1995) (concluding
employer monopsony played a small part in setting wages in turn-of-the-century
coal mining).
48. See Lofaso, supra note 44, at 92 (defining monopsony).
49. Id. at 93-94.
50. Glasmeier, supra note 41.
51. Lofaso, supra note 44, at 92.
52. Kuykendall, supra note 24; but see Lofaso, supra note 44, at 92 (stating in
2009, the mean annual wage of U.S. coal miners ranged from $45,690 to $47,650).
53. Kuykendall, supra note 24 (quoting Mr. Brett Dillon).
54. See, e.g., Lofaso, supra note 44, at 91-96 (describing the power disparity
between Appalachian coal miners and operators); McGinley, supra note 19, at 26972 (summarizing labor-management conflicts between the 1900s and 1940s in the
Appalachian coalfields).
55. Lofaso, supra note 44, at 95; see also William M. Boal & Michael R.
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II. Temporary Reinstatement Under the Mine Act
Section 105(c) of the Mine Act, the anti-discrimination
provision, prohibits operators from discriminating against "any
miner, representative of miners or applicant for employment in
any coal or other mine" for exercising their rights under the Mine
Act.
Any miner, miner representative, or applicant for
employment who believes that he or she has been discriminated
against may file a discrimination complaint with the Secretary of
Labor ("Secretary"). 7
Specifically, section 105(c)(2) of the Mine Act, the temporary
reinstatement provision, provides that "if the Secretary finds that
such [a discrimination] complaint was not frivolously brought, the
Commission, on an expedited basis upon application of the
Secretary, shall order the immediate reinstatement of the miner
pending final order on the [discrimination] complaint. ' 8 In other
words, the temporary reinstatement provision permits a
preliminary proceeding prior to the adjudication of a
discrimination complaint59 that is only available to miners, and not
miner representatives or applicants for employment.0 In essence,
an order granting temporary reinstatement permits a miner to
remain on the job while his or her discrimination case is pending
before the Commission. 1
The scope of the temporary reinstatement proceeding is
narrow 2 and is held for the purpose of determining whether the
miner's complaint is not frivolously brought. The "not frivolously
brought" standard is not defined in the Mine Act; 4 however, it is
Ransom, Monopsony in the Labor Market, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 86, 92-93 (1997)
(explaining in terms of labor market monopsony that post-hire exploitation of
workers is only possible if moving costs are important to the worker, turnover costs
are unimportant to the employer, and the employer does not commit to future
wages).
56. 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1) (2006).
57. Id. § 815(c)(2).
58. Id. (emphasis added); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2700.45 (2012) (temporary
reinstatement procedure).
59. Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Price v. Jim Walter Res., Inc., 9 FMSHRC 1305, 1306
(Aug. 1987), affld sub nom. Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. FMSHRC, 920 F.2d 738 (11th
Cir. 1990).
60. Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Young v. Lone Mountain Processing, Inc., 20 FMSHRC
927, 931 (Sept. 1998).
61. ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMP'T LAW, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

LAW 648-55 (Randy S. Rabinowitz et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008).
62. Id.
63. Id. The Secretary has the burden of proof to establish that the complaint
was not frivolously brought. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.45(d) (2012).
64. Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Bussanich v. Centralia Mining Co., 22 FMSHRC 153,
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indistinguishable from the "reasonable cause to believe" standard
applied in other statutes.
Furthermore, the Commission has
specified that the scope of a temporary reinstatement proceeding
does not include an adjudication of the merits of the underlying
discrimination complaint.66
Hence, the proceeding will not
consider whether there is sufficient evidence of discrimination to
justify permanent reinstatement.67
In addition, it is wellestablished that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ" or "judge")
should not resolve disputes of fact or credibility during the
temporary reinstatement proceeding.68
Thus, a temporary
reinstatement proceeding is "truncated" in nature, and the parties
cannot be expected to conduct a preliminary adjudication of the
merits of the discrimination claim.69
The
Commission
reviews
the
judge's
temporary
reinstatement order under the substantial evidence test for an
abuse of discretion." "'Substantial evidence' means 'such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support [the judge's] conclusion.'7. 1
III. Secretary of Labor ex rel. Piper v. KenAmerican
Resources, Inc.
Piper represents how coal miners will be more susceptible to
discriminatory layoffs and recalls due to the boom and bust cycles
of the U.S. coal mining industry.2 Piper concerns an alleged
discriminatory recall in the temporary reinstatement context and
factually represents how layoffs and recalls affect coal miners.
157 (Feb. 2000).
65. Id. (citation omitted); see also Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. FMSHRC, 920 F.2d
738, 747 (11th Cir. 1990) (discussing the "not frivolously brought" standard).
66. Disciplinary Proceeding, 24 FMSHRC 465, 467 n.2 (May 2002).
67. Jim Walter Res., Inc., 920 F.2d at 744 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2); 29
C.F.R. § 2700.44(c) (1989)) (emphasis added); see also Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Price v.
Jim Walter Res., Inc., 9 FMSHRC 1305, 1306 (Aug. 1987).
68. Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Albu v. Chicopee Coal Co., 21 FMSHRC 717, 719 (July
1999).
69. DisciplinaryProceeding, 24 FMSHRC at 467 n.2.
70. Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Ratliffv. Cobra Natural Res., LLC, 35 FMSHRC 394,
396 (Feb. 2013) (citing Albu, 21 FMSHRC at 719); Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Peters v.
Thunder Basin Coal Co., 15 FMSHRC 2425, 2426 (Dec. 1993). The terms of the
Mine Act require the Commission to apply the substantial evidence test when
reviewing the judge's factual determinations. 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006).
71. Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Bussanich v. Centralia Mining Co., 22 FMSHRC 153,
157 n.5 (Feb. 2000) (quoting Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., 11 FMSHRC 2159,
2163 (Nov. 1989)).
72. See supra Part I.B.
73. Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Piper v. KenAmerican Resources, Inc., 35 FMSHRC
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On December 31, 2012, Mr. Darrick Piper was one of ten miners
who were laid off due to deteriorating economic conditions at
KenAmerican's Paradise Number 9 Mine, 4 a large underground
coal mine in Muhlenberg County located in western Kentucky.5
On February 1, 2013, Mr. Piper filed a discrimination
complaint with MSHA alleging, in part, that he was discharged in
retaliation for engaging in protected activity in violation of section
105(c)(2) of the Mine Act, due to a report that he had made in
October 2012 that he believed that his face boss was using drugs.
The Secretary then filed an application for temporary
reinstatement on March 19, 2013, requesting an order requiring
KenAmerican to reinstate Mr. Piper.
However, the Secretary
later submitted an unopposed motion to dismiss the application
after determining that its investigation had not yielded enough
facts on the merits to support a violation of section 105(c) of the
Mine Act. 8 Accordingly, the ALJ dismissed the proceeding."
At the end of February 2013, KenAmerican lifted its hiring
freeze and the mine operator considered recalling the ten miners
who had been laid off on December 31st." The mine operator
invited six of the laid-off miners to speak with it, and of those six,
four of the laid-off miners were offered the chance to return to
work, which three accepted. 1 During this time, Mr. Piper was not
contacted by KenAmerican and thus was not recalled. 2
On March 27, 2013, after Mr. Piper had learned about
KenAmerican recalling the other employees, he contacted the
mine operator to ask about returning to work. 3 The mine's
manager of human resources refused to speak with Mr. Piper due

1969, 1970 (July 2013).
74. Id. at 1969.
75. Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Lear v. KenAmerican Res., Inc., Docket No. 2014-708D, slip op. at 2 (F.M.S.H.R.C. Sept. 8, 2014) (ALJ), http://www.fmshrc.gov/decisions
/alj/ALJd 09082014-KENT%202014-708-D%2oDecision%20and%200rder%20of%2
0Temporary%20Reinstatement.pdf; Muhlenberg County, Kentucky, http://www.
muhlenbergcounty.ky.gov/ (last updated Aug. 22, 2007). Even though Muhlenberg
County is in western Kentucky's coalfield region, as opposed to the eastern
Appalachian region, Piper still typifies the impacts that layoffs and recalls have on
coal miners in Appalachia.
76. Piper, 35 FMSHRC at 1970.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1970-71.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1971.
83. Id.
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to his pending February 1st discrimination complaint.84
Consequently, Mr. Piper believed that the mine operator had
"blackballed" him." As a result, he filed a second discrimination
complaint with MSHA on March 27, 2013, while his March 19th
application for temporary reinstatement was still pending for his
February 1st discrimination complaint."
In his second complaint, Mr. Piper alleged that he had not
been included in KenAmerican's recall of laid-off employees
because of his February 1st discrimination complaint. 7
Subsequently, on May 14, 2013, the Secretary filed a second
application for temporary reinstatement for Mr. Piper's second
discrimination complaint."
In this application, the Secretary
alleged that the mine's human resources manager refused to
speak with Mr. Piper about the recall, and contacted and recalled
other employees from the December 31st layoff.89
On June 6, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision in which he
concluded that the March 27th discrimination complaint was not
frivolously brought, and Mr. Piper was a "miner" for purposes of
section 105(c)(2) of the Mine Act and thus was eligible for
temporary reinstatement.9
Accordingly, KenAmerican was
ordered to provide temporary reinstatement to Mr. Piper.91
On review, the issue before the Commission was whether Mr.
Piper was a "miner," and therefore afforded coverage under the
Mine Act's temporary reinstatement provision. The Commission
majority resolved this issue based on the facts of the case, since
Mr. Piper engaged in protected activity by filing a discrimination
complaint when he was employed as a "miner"-the February 1st
discrimination complaint.93 This protected activity carried over to
Mr. Piper's second discrimination complaint-not being recalled
from the layoff.9' Therefore, since Mr. Piper was engaged in
protected activity-filing the February 1st discrimination
complaint-while employed by KenAmerican, he was found to be a

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(Mr. Darrick Piper's testimony before the ALJ).
at 1970-71.
at 1970.

at 1971.

at 1971-74.
at 1972-73.
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miner for purposes of the Act.
Consequently, the majority left
unresolved whether or at what point coverage ends under the
temporary reinstatement provision for a laid-off miner who is not
recalled, or whether an individual must be employed when he or
she engages in protected activity to be covered by the temporary
reinstatement provision."
Chairman Jordan, concurring in result, illustrated another
way to reach the conclusion that Mr. Piper was a "miner" for
purposes of temporary reinstatement.
Chairman Jordan would
have granted Chevron deference 8 to the Secretary's interpretation
of the term "miner" in section 105(c)(2) of the Act.
She agreed
with the Secretary that the term "miner" in this section was
ambiguous. 0
Chairman Jordan found that the Secretary's
interpretation of the term "miner," which included laid-off
employees who make a non-frivolous discrimination complaint,
was reasonable because it furthered the purpose of the Mine Act,
and was consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
term "employee," under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196411
("Title VII"), 102 in the context of general employment
discrimination.
Subsequently, Piper was appealed to the Sixth Circuit and
then voluntarily dismissed in an unpublished opinion. 10

95. Id. at 1974.
96. See id. at 1972 ("We need not explore in this case the full contours of the
distinction between a 'miner' and an 'applicant for employment' under section
105(c)(2); rather, we conclude that under the facts of this case Piper must be
regarded as a 'miner' for temporary reinstatement purposes.").
97. Id. at 1975-77.
98. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84244 (1984); Performance Coal Co. v. FMSHRC, 642 F.3d 234 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(explaining application of Chevron deference under the Mine Act); see also Sec'y of
Labor v. Excel Mining, LLC, 334 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Chevron, 467
U.S. 837) (stating that under the Mine Act, when the Secretary and the
Commission are divided on the interpretation of the Act, it is the Secretary (rather
than the Commission) who is entitled to the deference described in Chevron).
99. Piper, 35 FMSHRC at 1975.
100. Id.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
102. Piper, 35 FMSHRC at 1976 (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,
345-46 (1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a))).
103. FMSHRC, Commission Decisions on Appeal, http://www.fmshrc.gov/content
/commission-decisions-appeal-0 (last updated Sept. 17, 2014).
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IV. Recent Commission Temporary Reinstatement Layoff
Cases
The Commission majority in Piper seems to use the
substantial evidence test to evaluate the judge's decision by
utilizing a factual inquiry to determine whether there was an
employment relationship at the time when the protected activity
occurred, rather than focusing on when the adverse action
occurred.0 4
Focusing on when the protected activity occurs
represents a different approach compared to the recent
Commission temporary reinstatement decisions dealing solely
with layoffs, which consists of two categories-tolling cases and
discriminatory layoff cases."'
These cases focus on facts
surrounding the layoff, rather than the protected activity. Tolling
cases allow a limited inquiry during the temporary reinstatement
proceeding to determine if the layoff properly included the
complainant, 6 while discriminatory layoff cases treat the layoff as
an adverse action and thus apply the "not frivolously brought"
standard contained in section 105(c)(2) of the Mine Act. 0 7
A. Tolling Cases
The Commission's tolling cases cumulated in Secretary of
Labor ex rel. Ratliff v. Cobra Natural Resources, LLC, which
brought together three previous Commission decisions."' For the
first time the Commission stated that a limited inquiry is
permitted during the temporary reinstatement proceeding to
determine whether the mine operator's obligation to reinstate a
miner can be tolled due to a layoff that occurs after the adverse
action against the complainant. 9
To toll temporary
reinstatement, a mine operator must affirmatively prove, by a

104. See Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Ratliff v. Cobra Natural Res., LLC, 35 FMSHRC
394, 396 (Feb. 2013) (citing Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Albu v. Chicopee Coal Co., 21
FMSHRC 717, 719 (July 1999)) (stating that the Commission reviews a judge's
temporary reinstatement order under the substantial evidence test for an abuse of
discretion); Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Peters v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 15 FMSHRC
2425, 2426 (Dec. 1993) (same).
105. See cases cited supra note 4.
106. See Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Gatlin v. KenAmerican Res., Inc., 31 FMSHRC
1050, 1055 n.5 (Oct. 2009) (instructions on remand).
107. See Ratliff, 35 FMSHRC at 397.
108. Id. (citing Shemwell I, 34 FMSHRC 996 (May 2012); Gatlin, 31 FMSHRC
1050; Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Ondreako v. Kennecott Utah Copper Corp., 25 FMSHRC
585 (Oct. 2003)).
109. Id. at 396-97 (quoting Shemwell I, 34 FMSHRC at 1000).
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preponderance of the evidence, that the "layoff properly included"
the complainant.1
Hence, during the temporary reinstatement proceeding and
after the initial showing that the complaint was not frivolously
brought, the judge may consider evidence offered by the mine
operator seeking to affirmatively show that reinstatement should
be tolled because of a layoff due to a business reduction or similar
conditions.111 In determining whether the layoff properly included
the complainant, the judge should look at the mine operator's
layoff procedures and determine how the mine operator actually
made layoff decisions-i.e., whether the mine operator actually
followed its layoff procedures.1 2 The judge may also consider any
challenges by the Secretary that the complainant's inclusion in
such a layoff was, or might have been, related to the complainant's
protected activity. 3 Thus, Commission precedent recognizes that
a change in the mine operator's circumstances may be relevant to
tolling temporary reinstatement when the adverse action precedes
a layoff, and therefore permits a limited inquiry during the
temporary reinstatement
proceeding for the mine operator to raise
1 14
an economic defense.
B. DiscriminatoryLayoff Cases
Ratliff also distinguished discriminatory layoff cases from
tolling cases.
Discriminatory layoff cases fall under the "not
frivolously brought" standard because a layoff is a termination of
employment.1
A discriminatory layoff must be evaluated as a
potentially wrongful adverse action, and if the objectivity of the
layoff is challenged during the temporary reinstatement
proceeding, the judge must apply the "not frivolously brought"

110. Id. at 397 (citing Gatlin, 31 FMSHRC at 1055).
111. Id. (citing Gatlin, 31 FMSHRC at 1054).
112. See Gatlin, 31 FMSHRC at 1055 n.5 (explaining that, on remand,
KenAmerican should explain how all of the factors it considered (mining
experience, skill level, performance, and years of service) "were applied to Mr.
Gatlin or why any factor not applied was deemed irrelevant" since it only asserted
that three of these factors were relevant in laying off Mr. Gatlin).
113. Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Ratliffv. Cobra Natural Res., LLC, 35 FMSHRC 394,
397 (Feb. 2013).
114. Id. (citing Shemwell I, 34 FMSHRC at 1000); see also Gatlin, 31 FMSHRC
at 1054 (citing Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Shepherd v. Sovereign Mining Co., 15
FMSHRC 2450 (Dec. 1993)).
115. Ratliff, 35 FMSHRC at 397 (citing Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Ondreako v.
Kennecott Utah Copper Corp., 25 FMSHRC 585, 586-87 (Oct. 2003)).
116. Id.
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standard contained in section 105(c)(2) of the Mine Act.117
Therefore, no limited inquiry is permitted during a temporary
reinstatement proceeding for discriminatory layoff cases, as it is in
tolling cases.
Moreover, the ultimate determination concerning the
appropriate remedy for any alleged discrimination, including the
duration of the mine operator's reinstatement obligation, if any, is
made during the discrimination proceeding on the merits.1 8 This
approach corresponds with the general employment discrimination
jurisprudence that treats a discriminatory layoff as a discrete
adverse action.1
V. Statutory Interpretation of the Term "Miner" in the
Temporary Reinstatement Provision
The temporary reinstatement provision of the Mine Act
provides that "if the Secretary finds that such [a discrimination]
complaint was not frivolously brought, the Commission, on an
expedited basis upon application of the Secretary, shall order the
immediate reinstatement of the miner pending final order on the
[discrimination] complaint. '1 21
The plain language of the
temporary reinstatement provision explicitly limits temporary
reinstatement only to miners, and not miner representatives or
applicants for employment. 12 Likewise, the Commission has held
that temporary reinstatement is only available to miners, and not
to miner representatives and applicants for employment.
In the context of discriminatory recalls, Piper left unresolved
whether or at what point coverage under the temporary
reinstatement provision ends for a laid-off miner.1 2 3 Similarly, it is
unclear whether an individual must be employed when he or she
engages in protected activity to be covered by the temporary

117. Id.
118. Id. at 398.
119. See 2 EMP'T DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW §

73:26 (last updated Nov. 2013) ("The typical discriminatory layoff is a completed
act and therefore would not be considered a continuing violation, but rather a
discrete discriminatory or retaliatory act.").
120. 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2) (2006) (temporary restatement provision) (emphasis
added).
121. Compare id. § 815(c)(1) (anti-discrimination provision), with id. § 815(c)(2)
(temporary restatement provision).
122. Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Young v. Lone Mountain Processing, Inc., 20 FMSHRC
927, 930 (Sept. 1998).
123. See Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Piper v. KenAmerican Resources, Inc., 35
FMSHRC 1969, 1971-73 (July 2013).
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reinstatement provision.1 2 '
The answers to these questions
inevitably turn 12on
the
meaning
of the term "miner" in section 3(g)
5
of the Mine Act.
The term "miner" in section 3(g) of the Mine Act 1 2 is
ambiguous.
Consequently, its meaning must be interpreted
within the specific context of the temporary reinstatement
provision to effectuate the purpose of the Mine Act.
A. The Term "Miner"in Section 3(g) of the Mine Act Is
Ambiguous
The term "miner" in section 3(g) of the Mine Act is defined as
46,,121
any individual
working in a coal or other mine.
Within the
specific context of the temporary reinstatement provision, the
term "miner" is ambiguous for two reasons. First, the verb
"working" has no temporal qualifier that is consistent with either
current or past employment.12 ' Thus, "working" could be either
present or past tense. 9
Second, Congress chose the verb
"working," rather than "employed." The word "working" is broader
than the word "employed."1 ' The verb "work" means "[tlo exert
124. See id. at 1972. See also Munsey v. Smitty Baker Coal Co., Inc., 2
FMSHRC 3463 (Dec. 1980) (stating the Commission does not need to reach the
issue of the necessity of an employment relationship to trigger the protection
against retaliation under section 110(b) of the Coal Act).
125. See 30 U.S.C. § 802(g) (2006) (defining "miner"); Piper, 35 FMSHRC at 1972
("We need not explore in this case the full contours of the distinction between a
'miner' and an 'applicant for employment' under section 105(c)(2); rather, we
conclude under the facts of this case Piper must be regarded as a 'miner' for
temporary reinstatement purposes.").
126. 30 U.S.C. § 802(g) (2006). The two-step Chevron analysis is used to review
the Secretary's interpretation of the Mine Act. See, e.g., N. Fork Coal Corp. v.
FMSHRC, 691 F.3d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 2012).
127. 30 U.S.C. § 802(g) (2006); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2700.2 (2012) ("For purposes
of this part, the definitions contained in section 3 of the [Mine] Act ...apply.").
128. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (reasoning the term
"employee" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) could have expressly included a qualifier);
but see McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 550 F.3d 519, 522, 526 (6th Cir. 2008)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)) (finding former employees are not covered by the
Americans with Disabilities Act's definition of qualified individual because the
statute uses present tense verbs).
129. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341 (utilizing same reasoning under Title VII).
130. See, e.g., Big Ridge, Inc., 34 FMSHRC 1003, 1044 (May 2012) (Comm'r
Duffy, dissenting) (reasoning that a request for medical records refers to "'all
individuals working at your mine,' rather than to 'all individuals employed by
you,"' thereby such verb usage "would seem to hold the operator accountable for the
medical records of employees of independent contractors who have no employment
relationship with the operator"). Big Ridge illustrates that the word "working" is
broader than the word "employed." This case was a consolidated case dealing with
citations issued by the Secretary for violations of 30 C.F.R. § 50.41 when several
mine operators "failed to cooperate with a 30 C.F.R. Part 50 audit by refusing to
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effort; to perform, either physically or mentally, 131 while "employ"
means "1. [to make use of. 2. [tlo hire. 132 Thus, the verbs
"working" and "employed" are not synonymous."
Moreover, the legislative history of the definition of the term
"miner" in the predecessor acts3 4 does not provide much guidance.
The Coal Act defined the term "miner" as "any individual working
in a coal mine, .13.
while the Metal and Nonmetal Act did not define
the term "miner" at all. 36
Furthermore, within the context of the Mine Act as a whole,
the term "miner" remains ambiguous for three more reasons.
First, the Mine Act does not define the other classes protected
under section 105(c)-the terms "representatives of miners" and
"applicants for employment."1 7 Hence, the meaning of the term
"miner" cannot be deduced by looking to these other terms.
Second, the term "miner," based on the language of section
3(g), has to be read in conjunction with the Mine Act's definition of
"mine." 8 A "mine" is defined as:

provide the requested information" regarding medical and payroll information. Id.
at 1005-06.
"The Secretary considered the records necessary to determine
compliance with [the] regulatory [Part 50] reporting requirements." Id. at 1005.
MSHA inspectors appeared at the mines in question on more than one occasion,
requesting that the operators furnish this documentation, as well as issuing
request letters for this documentation. Id. at 1008. Commissioner Duffy, in his
dissent, considered the language of the request letters. Id. at 1044.
131. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1599 (7th ed. 1999).
132. Id. at 543.
133. This view is also shared by the Commission. See Cyprus Empire Corp., 15
FMSHRC 10, 13 (Jan. 1993) (stating an individual's status as a miner is
determined by whether he or she works in a mine, not by whether he or she is
employed by a mine operator).
134. See Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act of 1966 (Metal and
Nonmetal Act), Pub. L. No. 89-577, 80 Stat. 772 (1966) (formerly codified at 30
U.S.C. §§ 721-740), repealed by Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-164, § 306(a), 91 Stat. 1290, 1322 (1977) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801 et
seq.) and Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (Coal Act), Pub. L. No.
91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (1969), amended by Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of
1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq.
135. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, §
3(g), 83 Stat. 742, 744 (1969) (general definition section).
136. Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89577, § 2, 80 Stat. 772-73 (1966) (general definition section).
137. Compare 30 U.S.C. § 802 (2006) (general definition section), with id. §
815(c) (anti-discrimination provision); but see 30 C.F.R. § 40.1(b) (2012) (defining
miner representative).
138. Compare 30 U.S.C. § 802(g) (2006) (defining "miner"), with id. § 802(h)(1)
(defining "mine"); see also Nat'l Indus. Sand Ass'n v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 689, 704
(3d Cir. 1979) ("As its standard, the statute looks to whether one works in a mine,
not ... whether one is involved in extraction or nonextraction operations.")
(emphasis in original); 53A AM. JUR. 2D Mines and Minerals § 17 (2006) (indicating
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(A) an area of land from which minerals are extracted... (B)
private ways and roads appurtenant to such area, and (C)
lands, excavations, underground passageways, shafts, slopes,
tunnels and workings, structures, facilities, equipment,
machines, tools, or other property including impoundments,
retention dams, and tailings ponds, on the surface or
underground, used in, or to be used in, or resulting from, the
work of extracting such minerals from their natural
deposits... or used in, or to be used in, the milling of such
minerals, or the work of preparing coal or other minerals, and
includes custom coal preparation facilities. 9

This definition offers little guidance regarding the necessity of an
employment relationship or any temporal qualification of the term
"miner;" rather it focuses on the location of the work. Moreover,
when faced with uncertainty concerning coverage of an individual
under the anti-discrimination provision, the Commission has
historically treated the term "miner" as a functional definition by
focusing on the individual's duties in relation to the mine
operator. 141
Third, the definition of the term "miner" is not consistently
used throughout the Mine Act as a whole. 141 The term "miner" has
different meanings in Title IV, the section dealing with black lung
benefits,142 and the mandatory health and safety training provision
in section 115(a). 14 3 Additionally, the Commission14 has
found that
4
miners on strike are not miners under section 3(g).

a related issue of whether a person is a "miner" under Title IV of the Mine Act is
whether the operation is a mine); 3-54 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW §
54.04[1] (2014) (describing the uncertainty that arose regarding the term "miner"
under Title IV of the Mine Act, yet this uncertainty was generally resolved on the
definition of "coal mine" in 30 U.S.C. § 902(d)).
139. 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1) (2006); cf id. § 802(h)(2) (defining "coal mine" for
purposes of Titles II, III, and IV).
140. See, e.g., S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Marshall, 464 F. Supp. 450, 454 (S.D. Ohio
1978) (citing McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 486 (1971)) (regarding whether
a section foreman is a "miner" for purposes of the Mine Act's temporary
reinstatement provision and stating that such factual issues could include the
nature of individual's duties and his relationship in a given position with the mine
operator); El Paso Rock Quarries, Inc., 3 FMSHRC 35, 37 (Jan. 1981) (concluding
that rock pickers were miners under section 3(g) because of their duties-they
broke, loaded, and hauled the rock out of the quarry); see also TIMOTHY M. BIDDLE
ET AL., § 201.04 Federal Protected Rights of Miners, in 6-201 AMERICAN LAW OF
MINING (2d ed.) (stating it is likely that anyone who works on mine property would
be considered a miner for purposes of the anti-discrimination provision).
141. Brock ex rel. Williams v. Peabody Coal Co., 822 F.2d 1134, 1151 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating the term "miner" may be interpreted
differently across the Mine Act).
142. 30 U.S.C. § 901-944 (2006) (Black Lung Benefits Act).
143. 30 U.S.C. § 825(a) (2006).
144. Cyprus Empire Corp., 15 FMSHRC 10, 13 (Jan. 1993).
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Title IV of the Mine Act

Title IV of the Mine Act, dealing with black lung benefits,
defines the term "miner" as:
[A]ny individual who works or has worked in or around a coal
mine or coal preparation facility in the extraction or
preparation of coal. Such term also includes an individual
who works or has worked in coal mine construction or
transportation in or around a coal mine, to the extent such
individual was exposed to coal dust as a result of such
141
employment.
Here, the use of both present and past tense indicates coverage of
current or 1past
employment, unlike the general definition in
4
section 3(g). 1
Notably, the Mine Act expanded the black lung statutory
definition of "miner" in three ways: (1) the word "employed" was
replaced with "works or has worked" in or around a coal mine; (2)
the Act incorporated the "preparation" component that was
already present in the regulation; 147 and (3) added a new sentence
expressly dealing with "construction or transportation in or
around a coal mine, to the extent such individual was exposed to
coal dust as a result of such employment. 14 8 These concurrent
changes suggest that if Congress wanted to limit the general
definition of "miner" to those in an employment relationship, it
would have done so.14 Significantly, Congress deliberately chose
to replace the word "employed" with the verb "work," thereby
favoring a broader verb that is not limited to the employment
relationship.
Additionally, like the general definition of "miner" in section
3(g), uncertainty about the black lung definition of "miner" has
generally been resolved based on the definition of "coal mine" in
conjunction to the definition of "miner"15 1 thereby15' 2firmly lodging
the concept of "preparing" into "mine" and "miner.

145. 30 U.S.C. § 902(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
146. Compare id., with id. § 802(g).
147. 3-54 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 54.04, supra note 138.
These two changes thus became the following: miner' means any individual who
works or has worked in or around a coal mine or coal preparation facility in the
extraction or preparation of coal." 30 U.S.C. § 902 (2006).
148. 3-54 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 54.04, supra note 138
(citing 30 U.S.C. § 902).
149. See Vulcan Constr. Materials, L.P. v. FMSHRC, 700 F.3d 297, 309 (7th Cir.
2012) (presuming Congress' choice of language is deliberate (citing Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))).
150. See supra notes 130-133 and accompanying text.
151. 3-54 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 54.04, supra note 138
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While the black lung provision is demonstrative of the
deliberate and purposeful drafting by Congress, it is not a suitable
analogue for interpreting section 3(g) of the Mine Act, because it
represents a different regulatory regime. Moreover, the black lung
definition of miner is narrower than the Act's general definition of
miner.15 3 Nevertheless, it demonstrates that Congress purposely
chose the verb "work" over the verb "employed," and thus the
meaning of these two verbs cannot be treated synonymously when
defining the term "miner" in section 3(g) of the Mine Act.
2.

Mandatory Health and Safety Training Provision

Laid-off individuals are not considered miners under section
3(g) for purposes of section 115(a) of the Mine Act.15 4 Section
115(a) provides the minimum requirements for a mandatory
health and safety training program for miners.
This provision
explicitly uses the term "miner. 1 56 In Brock ex rel. Williams v.
Peabody Coal Co.,157 the D.C. Circuit held that "an individual is not
a 'miner' who can claim a training right under section 115(a)
unless he or she is employed in a mine.15 8 The D.C. Circuit
reasoned that "Congress enacted section 115(a) ...to create a safe
and healthy work environment," but that laid-off individuals "are
not exposed to that environment., 15
Consequently, the court

(citing 30 U.S.C. § 902(d)).
152. Id.
153. Compare Falcon Coal Co., Inc. v. Clemons, 873 F.2d 916, 921-22 (6th Cir.
1989) (finding a night watchman at a strip mine is not a "miner" because his work
does not involve work integral to the "extraction" of coal), and Wisor v. Dir. Office
of Worker's Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 748 F.2d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 1984)
(concluding a person employed as a clay miner who is completely disabled by black
lung due to work necessitating digging through coal deposits to reach clay was not
a "miner," because the "claimant must satisfy the situs test by showing that he was
employed by a coal mining company"), with Nat'l Indus. Sand Ass'n v. Marshall,
601 F.2d 689, 704 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating the term "miner" in section 3(g) is to be
broadly interpreted), and Dir. Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep't of
Labor v. Consolidation Coal Co., 884 F.2d 926, 934 (6th Cir. 1989) (reversing a
Benefits Review Board holding that a coal mine employee who had worked as a
loader and belt operator and then in the machine shop was not a "miner").
154. Brock ex rel. Williams v. Peabody Coal Co., 822 F.2d 1134, 1149 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
155. See 30 U.S.C. § 825(a) (2006) (mandatory health and safety training
provision).
156. See id. § 825(a)(1)-(5) (using terms: "new miner," "all miners," "any miner,"
and "miner").
157. 822 F.2d 1134.
158. Id. at 1149 (emphasis in original).
159. Id. at 1148.
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reasoned that requiring laid-off individuals to receive such safety
training serves no statutory purpose."'
This only further supports the reasoning that the term
"miner" does not have the same meaning in all sections of the
Mine Act; rather the term standing alone is ambiguous, and thus
each section must be analyzed to determine whether the context
1 1
gives the term further meaning."
3.

Striking Miners

In Cyprus Empire Corp.,1 2 the Commission concluded that
striking employees were not miners entitled to walkaround rights
pursuant to section 103(f) of the Mine Act. 6
The Commission
emphasized the presence of the verb "working" in the definition of
"miner" in section 3(g) of the Act, and reasoned that individuals on
strike are not working in a mine.6
However, the Commission
noted that an individual's status as a miner is determined by
whether he or she works in a mine, and not by whether he or she
is employed by a mine operator.16
Subsequently, in Aloe Coal Co.,166 the Commission held that
striking individuals are not miners for purposes of section
103(g)(1) of the Mine Act.16 7 The Commission reasoned that
section 103(g)(1) is intended to encourage miners to become
involved in identifying hazards and to afford them an active part
in correcting those hazards by providing the right to request an
inspection whenever they reasonably believe that there is a
violation or a danger.18
The Commission's reasoning that striking miners are not
miners under section 3(g) mirrors the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in

160. Id.
161. See, e.g., id. at 1151 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating the term "miner"
may be interpreted differently in the Mine Act); see also 30 C.F.R. §§ 46.2(g)(1) &
48.2(a)(1) (2012) (defining the term "miner" under the education and training
requirements).
162. Cyprus Empire Corp., 15 FMSHRC 10, 15 (Jan. 1993).
163. Id. at 14 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 813(f)); but see id. at 15 (stating this holding
does not affect the right of miners to refuse to work pursuant to section 105(c) of
the Mine Act).
164. Id. at 13.
165. Id.
166. 15 FMSHRC 4 (Jan. 1993) (citing 30 U.S.C. § 813(g)(1)) (right of miner
representative or miner to obtain an immediate inspection by the Secretary).
167. Id. at 8 (stating that nowhere in section 103(g)(1) or the legislative history
is there any indication that the section was meant to limit the Secretary's broad
authority to inspect mines under section 103(a)).
168. Id.
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Williams that laid-off miners are not exposed to the safety and
health concerns that the Mine Act is meant to protect against.6
Consequently, the meaning of the term "miner" must effectuate
the purpose of the provision in which it is located.7
B. The Term "Miner"in the Temporary Reinstatement
Provision Includes Laid-off Miners Who Are
"Blackballed"by Not Being Recalled
The term "miner" is ambiguous, and thus must be
interpreted to effectuate the statutory purpose of the temporary
reinstatement provision. Such an interpretation must include
individuals who are laid off and then "blackballed" by not being
recalled based on the legislative history of the temporary
reinstatement provision and the Commission's jurisprudence that
an employment relationship is not necessary to be a "miner" under
section 3(g) of the Act.
1.

Legislative History

The legislative history presents two competing themes
regarding the temporary reinstatement provision:
(1) section
105(c), the anti-discrimination provision in which the temporary
reinstatement provision is located, must be construed expansively
to assure that miners will not be inhibited in exercising their
rights under the Mine Act; and (2) miners must play an "active
part" in enforcing the Act. Section 105(c) must be interpreted
expansively due to Congress' desire to protect the health and
safety of miners. 71 In enacting the Mine Act, Congress made clear
its intent that section 105(c) "be construed expansively to assure
that miners will not be inhibited in any way in exercising any
rights afforded by the legislation. 1 2 Congress' concern for the
safety and health of miners is further evidenced by the strong
remedial purpose of the Mine Act, contained within section

169. Compare id., with Brock ex rel. Williams v. Peabody Coal Co., 822 F.2d
1134, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
170. See Cyprus Empire Corp., 15 FMSHRC at 15 (indicating the term "miner"
must be interpreted in the context of the particular Mine Act section in which it
appears in order to effectuate the safety purposes of each section).
171. Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. FMSHRC, 920 F.2d 738, 751 (11th Cir. 1990)
(citing Brock ex rel. Parker v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 766 F.2d 469, 472 (11th
Cir. 1985) ("[It is] the accepted view that section 105(c) should be interpreted
expansively to protect the health and safety of miners.").
172. Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Pendley v. Highland Mining Co., 34 FMSHRC 1919,
1930 (Aug. 2012) (quoting S. REP. No. 95-181, at 36 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3436).
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105(c).173 Accordingly, an expansive interpretation of the term
"miner" is needed to effectuate the Act's anti-discrimination
provision. 174
The legislative history of section 105(c) also reveals that
Congress recognized that if the nation's mine safety and health
program was to be effective, then miners had to play an "active
part" in enforcing the Mine Act
The Senate report for the Mine
Act specifically stated:
If our national mine safety and health program is to be truly
effective, miners will have to play an active part in the
enforcement of the Act. The Committee is cognizant that if
miners are to be encouraged to be active in matters of safety
and health, they must be protected against any possible
discrimination
S••
176 which they might suffer as a result of their
participation.
These two themes are in competition with one another
because interpreting section 105(c) expansively is limited by
Congress' intent that miners must play an "active part" in
enforcing the Mine Act, which in turn suggests that Congress did
not want miners to sit on their rights. Inevitably, including
individuals who are laid off and then "blackballed" by not being
recalled as miners under the temporary reinstatement provision
would satisfy Congress' intent that section 105(c) be interpreted
expansively. However, this relates back to the question about
whether an individual must be employed when he or she engages
in protected activity to be covered by the temporary reinstatement
provision in order to satisfy Congress' intent that miners must
play an "active part" in enforcing the Mine Act. Satisfaction of
this "active part" requirement will turn on the facts of a given case
based on the allegations regarding why the complainant was not
recalled, but in itself does not preclude laid-off miners from
invoking the temporary reinstatement provision.
In addition to the two themes mentioned above, Congress
noted the power imbalance between miners and mine operators.7
The Committee stated that:

173. See Parker,766 F.2d at 472 (describing the Mine Act's remedial purpose as
strong in relation to section 105(c)(1)).
174. Id. (citations omitted).
175. Council of S. Mountains, Inc. v. FMSHRC, 751 F.2d 1418, 1419 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (citing S. REP. No. 95-181 (1977)).
176. S. REP. No. 95-181, at 35, 37 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401,
3435, 3437; see also H.R. REP. No. 95-655 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3485, 3499-3501.
177. See, e.g., Lofaso, supra note 44, at 92 ("Compared to mine operators, coal
miners are in a relatively weak position.").
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[M]ining often takes place in remote sections of the country,
and in places where work in the mines offers the only real
employment opportunity ... The Committee feels that this
temporary reinstatement is an essential protection for
complaining miners who may not be in the financial position
to suffer even a short period of unemployment or reduced
income pending the resolution of the discrimination
complaint.178
This statement echoes concerns about employer monopsony-i.e.,
that in places like rural Appalachia, coal mining is essentially the
only industry. 79 Moreover, concern about the financial position of
miners aligns with the historical boom and bust cycles of the
mining industry, 80 thereby making it more likely that Congress
contemplated some coverage of laid-off individuals under the
temporary reinstatement provision.
The Senate Report suggests that Congress was well aware of
the inequalities and power disparities in the mining industry
when it drafted the Mine Act. 81 This is precisely why an order for
temporary reinstatement permits a miner to remain on the job
and not forgo lost income while his or her discrimination case is
pending before the Commission.1 1 2 Therefore, in order to effectuate
the statutory purpose of the temporary reinstatement provision in
light of Congress' concerns, an interpretation of the term "miner"
in that provision must include individuals who are laid off and
then "blackballed" by not being recalled.
2.

An Employment Relationship Is Not Necessary to Be a
"Miner" Under Section 3(g) of the Mine Act

An employment relationship is not necessary to be considered
a "miner" under section 3(g) of the Mine Act, even though Piper
seems to frame the scope of the term "miner" in the temporary
reinstatement provision around the factual inquiry of whether
there was an employment relationship at the time the protected
activity occurred.8
The Commission's jurisprudence has stated

178. S. REP. No. 95-181, at 35, 37 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401,
3435, 3437; see also H.R. REP. 95-655 (Conf. Rep.) (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3485.
179. See supra Part I.C.
180. See McGinley, supra note 19, at 271-77 (describing volatility of the U.S.
coal industry from 1940 to 2009).
181. See S. REP. No. 95-181, at 1-5 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 340105.
182. See ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMP'T LAW, supra note 61.
183. Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Piper v. KenAmerican Resources, Inc., 35 FMSHRC
1969, 1971-74 (July 2013).
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that nowhere in the Mine Act is one's status as a "miner"
contingent upon an employment relationship with the owner or
mine operator.184 This is because section 3(g), which defines the
term "miner,"
uses the verb "working" rather than the verb
18
"employed.""
Moreover, the Commission has stated that it
believes that the Mine Act is not an employment statute, but
instead a health and safety statute.8
Such a belief aligns with
the well-established principle that the term "miner" in section 3(g)
should be construed expansively 7 and interpreted to effectuate
the provision in which the term is located.8 Thus, for purposes of
the temporary reinstatement provision, the term "miner" should
extend beyond the existence of an immediate employment
relationship.
Nevertheless, the existence of an employment relationship
does have some significance in the context of discriminatory
recalls, because the presence of an employment relationship
presents a greater opportunity for retaliation9-i.e., not being
recalled.
Similarly, the Commission has recognized that
"discrimination may manifest itself in subtle or indirect forms of
adverse action."190 Such subtle or indirect forms of discrimination
could encompass a discriminatory recall, especially in a boom and
bust industry like mining. A series of layoffs and recalls could
conceal what is ultimately the adverse action of a discriminatory
termination when an individual is not recalled from a layoff.1

184. El Paso Rock Quarries, Inc., 3 FMSHRC 35, 37 & n.ll (Jan. 1981); see also
Cyprus Empire Corp., 15 FMSHRC 10, 13 (Jan. 1993) (stating an individual's
status as a miner is determined by whether he or she works in a mine, not by
whether he or she is employed by a mine operator); Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Logan v.
Bright Coal Co., Inc., 6 FMSHRC 2520, 2525-26 (Nov. 1984) (holding a person's
status as an informer is not dependent on whether that person is an employee of a
mine operator).
185. See 30 U.S.C. § 802(g) (2006); Cyprus Empire Corp., 15 FMSHRC at 13; El
PasoRock Quarries,Inc., 3 FMSHRC at 37; see also supra Part V.A.
186. See UMWA ex rel. Rowe v. Peabody Coal Co., 7 FMSHRC 1357, 1364 (Sept.
1985) (citing 30 U.S.C. § 825).
187. See Nat'l Indus. Sand Ass'n v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 689, 704 (3d Cir. 1979).
188. See Cyprus Empire Corp., 15 FMSHRC at 14-15.
189. See Logan, 6 FMSHRC at 2520-21 (regarding the informer's privilege).
190. Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Jenkins v. Hecla-Day Mines Corp., 6 FMSHRC 1842,
1848 n.2 (Aug. 1984); but see Fucik v. United States, 655 F.2d 1089, 1096 (Ct. Cl.
1981) (qualifying this by stating that an adverse action does not mean any action
which an employee does not like).
191. Ultimately, an adverse action only needs to be conduct that is detrimental
to one's employment relationship, and not being recalled would satisfy this
definition. See Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Pendley v. Highland Mining Co., 34 FMSHRC
1919, 1930 (Aug. 2012) (citing Pendley v. FMSHRC, 601 F.3d 417, 428 (6th Cir.
2010)) (defining adverse action).
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This further supports the argument that laid-off miners are
covered under the temporary reinstatement provision of the Mine
Act; however, an immediate employment relationship is not
necessary for such coverage.

VI. A Workable Legal Standard for Discriminatory Recalls
in the Context of Temporary Reinstatement Will Likely
Use a Case-by-Case Approach
A workable legal standard for the application of temporary
reinstatement in discriminatory recall cases will likely use a caseby-case approach. This will provide the malleability needed to
navigate the boom and bust nature of the mining industry given
the facts of a particular case. Moreover, such an approach will
further build upon the majority's reasoning in Piper and
incorporate elements from the Commission's previous decisions
involving tolling and discriminatory layoff cases. Similarly, a
case-by-case approach balances the two competing themes from
the Mine Act's legislative history and jurisprudence that section
105(c) must be construed expansively to assure that miners will
not be inhibited in exercising their rights under the Mine Act, but
at the same time miners must play an "active part" in enforcing
the Act and not sit on their rights. Finally, anti-discrimination
provisions in other statutes support the use of a case-by-case
approach in the context of discriminatory recalls, but such statutes
are not dispositive in formulating, refining, and applying a legal
standard, because the9 2concept of temporary reinstatement is
unique to the Mine Act.
A. Relation to the Commission's Previous Decisions
Involving Tolling and DiscriminatoryLayoff Cases and
the Legislative History of the Mine Act
Evaluating an allegation of an adverse action against a miner
within the context of an alleged discriminatory recall demands a
case-by-case approach in which the Commission closely examines
the surrounding facts and circumstances of a given case.9 A caseby-case approach is needed because different treatment does not

192. See James H. Swain, Protecting Individual Employees, Is It Safe to
ComplainAbout Safety?, 9 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 59, 125 (1988) (stating the Mine
Act covers only employees in the mining industry).
193. See Pendley, 34 FMSHRC at 1930 (citing Hecla-Day Mines Corp., 6
FMSHRC at 1848 n.2) (stating determinations regarding whether an adverse
action occurred in a discrimination case must be made on a case-by-case basis and
will involve an examination of the surrounding circumstances).
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always amount to illegal discrimination under the Mine Act,
especially when there is a sufficient lawful reason for the
challenged difference.9 4 As such, the Commission has recognized
that a layoff for economic reasons is a lawful reason for different
treatment of miners.9 This is precisely why a change in the mine
operator's circumstances is relevant to tolling temporary
reinstatement and the mine operator can raise a subsequent layoff
as an economic defense to temporary reinstatement.
A case-by-case approach, in the context of discriminatory
recalls, will permit a limited inquiry at the temporary
reinstatement proceeding to determine if the recall properly
excluded the complainant. Even though temporary reinstatement
proceedings are limited in scope and do not entail a trial of the
merits or the resolution of creditability issues, 97 Ratliff suggests
that limited inquiries are permissible in some circumstances
during a temporary reinstatement proceeding.9
Thus, a
temporary
reinstatement proceeding
in the context of
discriminatory recalls could similarly permit an analogous limited
inquiry during the temporary reinstatement proceeding to that
used in tolling cases. Additionally, the "not frivolously brought"
standard would still apply in discriminatory recall cases, just like
discriminatory layoff cases, because not being recalled, like being
laid off, is a termination of employment and so the judge must still
apply the "not frivolously brought" standard contained in section
105(c)(2) 9 9
Moreover, a case-by-case approach balances the two
competing themes that appear in the Mine Act's legislative history
as well as in the jurisprudence regarding other sections of the
194. Delisio v. Mathies Coal Co., 12 FMSHRC 2535, 2540 (Dec. 1990) (quoting
Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Price v. Jim Walter Res., Inc., 12 FMSHRC 1521, 1532-33
(Aug. 1990)) (finding no discrimination with respect to the employment
relationship when an employer did not pay an employee, called as a witness
against it, the difference between what the employee would have earned had he
worked and what the party calling him as a witness was willing to pay).
195. See Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Gatlin v. KenAmerican Res., Inc., 31 FMSHRC
1050, 1054 (Oct. 2009) (citing Simpson v. Kenta Energy, Inc., 11 FMSHRC 1638,
1639 (Sept. 1989)) (permitting tolling a mine operator's temporary reinstatement
obligation when a layoff occurs for economic reasons).
196. See Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Ratliff v. Cobra Natural Res., LLC, 35 FMSHRC
397 (Feb. 2013) (citing Shemwell I, 34 FMSHRC 996, 1000 (May 2012)); see also
Gatlin, 31 FMSHRC at 1054 (citing Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Shepherd v. Sovereign
Mining Co., 15 FMSHRC 2450 (Dec. 1993)).
197. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
198. See Ratliff, 35 FMSHRC at 397 (citing Gatlin, 31 FMSHRC at 1055)
(regarding tolling a mine operator's obligation to restate a miner).
199. Id. (regarding discriminatory layoff cases).
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Mine Act: (1) that section 105(c) must be construed expansively to
assure that miners will not be inhibited in exercising their rights
under the Mine Act, and (2) that miners must play an "active part"
in enforcing the Act and not sit on their rights. 20 A case-by-case
approach will balance these two competing themes by allowing the
term "miner" to include those individuals who are laid off, thereby
allowing an expansive construction of section 105(c), while also
allowing the Commission to determine, at a later point in time,
what the term "active part" entails based on when protected
activity occurs given the facts of a particular case under review.
Determining what the term "active part" means given the facts of
a particular case will resolve both the uncertainty surrounding
whether an individual must be employed when he or she engages
in protected activity to be covered by the temporary reinstatement
provision, and the question concerning at what point coverage
under the temporary reinstatement provision ends for a laid-off
miner.
B. Relation to Anti-DiscriminationProvisionsin Other
Statutes
Even though the concept of a statute ordering temporary
reinstatement while a discriminatee's complaint is pending is
unique to the Mine Act, 21 anti-discrimination provisions in other
statutes support the use of a case-by-case approach in the context
of discriminatory recalls. Various Commission decisions have
referenced case law interpreting the anti-discrimination provisions
contained in the National Labor Relations Act 0 2 ("NLRA") and
Title VII in resolving questions concerning the proper construction
of the Mine Act's anti-discrimination provision. 03
200. See Aloe Coal Co., 15 FMSHRC 4, 8 (Jan. 1993) (citing 30 U.S.C. §
813(g)(1)) (wanting miners to have an active part in requesting inspections under
section 103(g)(1) of the Mine Act); see also supra note 176 and accompanying text
(recognizing miners have to play an active part in enforcing the Mine Act for the
nation's mine safety and health program to be effective).
201. See Swain, supra note 192.
202. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.
203. See e.g., Berwind Natural Res. Corp., 21 FMSHR 1284, 1309 (Dec. 1999)
(citing Swift v. Consolidation Coal Co., 16 FMSHRC 201, 206 (Feb. 1994))
(standard for facial discrimination); Delisio v. Mathies Coal Co., 12 FMSHRC 2535,
2542-45 (Dec. 1990) (legality of operator's policy of paying employees who testify as
witnesses on its behalf, but not paying employee for time spent testifying as
another party's witness); Local 2274, UMWA v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 10 FMSHRC
1493, 1501 n.6, 1504-05 (Nov. 1988) (appropriate rate of interest on backpay
awards), affd sub nom. Clinchfield Coal Co. v. FMSHRC, 895 F.2d 773 (D.C. Cir.
1990); Metric Constructors, Inc., 6 FMSHRC 226, 231-33 (Feb. 1984) (mitigation
defense to backpay award), affd, Brock ex rel. Parker v. Metric Constructors, Inc.,
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Both the NLRA and Title VII support using a case-by-case
approach with a multi-factor analysis in the context of
discriminatory recalls.
The NLRA supports a case-by-case
approach in discriminatory recall cases that looks at the facts and
circumstances of a given case. 4 Similarly, Title VII suggests that
several factors can be considered under such an approach, which
are:
(1) whether the layoff suggested a possibility of
reemployment, (2) whether there is a claim of continuing
discrimination after a layoff, and (3) whether the company had
bound itself by some procedure (preferably written) in making
recall decisions.2 " These Title VII factors are similar to those used
in Mine Act tolling cases2 6 and amount to a case-by-case approach
based on the facts and circumstances of the case.
Conclusion
The definition of "miner" in section 3(g) of the Mine Act is
ambiguous and thus must be interpreted within the specific
context of section 105(c)(2) of the Mine Act. The legislative history
of section 105(c)(2) suggests that Congress provided for temporary
reinstatement under the Act to provide some equitable balance
given the socioeconomic inequalities that faced miners and also
contemplated the boom and bust cycles in the mining industry.
Consequently, such an interpretation will include miners who are
laid off and then "blackballed" by not being recalled.
Today, the economic realities facing the coal mining industry
make the prospect of layoffs and recalls more likely; therefore, a
case-by-case approach will provide the malleability needed to
make the application of the Mine Act's temporary reinstatement
provision conform to changes in the industry as they occur.
Moreover, such an approach further builds upon the Commission

766 F.2d 469 (11th Cir. 1985) (interpreting the definition of "operator" under
section 2(d) of the Mine Act). Moreover, the NLRA served as a model for the
framers of Title VII. Berwind, 21 FMSHRC at 1313 (citing Armbruster v. Quinn,
711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983), abrogated by Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500
(2006)).
204. See Skyline Homes, Inc. v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 642, 647 (5th Cir. 1963)
(regarding discriminatory recalls under section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, in which it
should be considered whether the discriminatee was not offered reemployment
based on the facts and circumstances of the case).
205. Cox v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289, 290-91 (7th Cir. 1969) (involving a
Title VII sex discrimination case where five women were laid off, men with less
seniority were recalled, and new men were hired to fill jobs that these women were
qualified to perform).
206. See Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Gatlin v. KenAmerican Res., Inc., 31 FMSHRC
1050, 1055 n.5 (Oct. 2009).
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majority's reasoning in Piper and incorporates elements from the
Commission's
previous
decisions
involving
tolling
and
discriminatory layoff cases. Similarly, this approach balances the
two competing themes in the Mine Act's legislative history and
jurisprudence that section 105(c) must be construed expansively to
assure that miners will not be inhibited in exercising their rights
under the Mine Act, and miners must have an "active part" in
enforcing the Act and not sit on their rights.

